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On the implementation of Markov-Perfect interest rate and money supply rules : global and local uniqueness

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  • Michael Dotsey
  • Andreas Hornstein

Abstract

Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. This literature usually solves for the optimal allocations that are consistent with a rational expectations market equiibrium, but it does not study how the policy can be implemented given the available policy instruments. Recently, however, King and Wolman (2004) have shown that a time-consistent policy cannot be implemented through the control of nominal money balances. In particular, they find that equilibria are not unique under a money stock regime. We find that their conclusion of non-uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibria is sensitive to the instrument of choice. Surprisingly, if, instead, the monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate, there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. We then investigate under what conditions a time-consistent planner can implement the optimal allocation by simply announcing his policy rule in a decentralized setting.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number 09-06.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:09-06

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Keywords: Monetary policy ; Interest rates;

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  1. King, Robert G. & Wolman, Alexander L., 2004. "Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/22, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  2. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 2001. "Timing and real indeterminacy in monetary models," Working Paper 9910R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  3. Bernardino Adão & Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 2001. "Gaps and triangles," Working Paper Series WP-01-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," NBER Working Papers 9419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bennett T. McCallum, 1981. "On Non-Uniqueness in Rational Expectations Models: An Attempt at Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument," Staff Report 394, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  7. Boyd Iii, J.H. & Dotsey, M., 1990. "Interest Rate Rules And Nominal Determinacy," RCER Working Papers 222, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 1998. "Price-level and interest-rate targeting in a model with sticky prices," Working Paper 9819, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
  10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler & Gerhard Sorger, 2013. "Central Bank Independence And The Monetary Instrument Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1031-1055, 08.
  2. Willem Van Zandweghe & Alexander L. Wolman, 2010. "Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model," Research Working Paper RWP 10-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  3. Dennis, Richard & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2010. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures: Selecting among Multiple Discretionary Equilibria," MPRA Paper 24616, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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