Meeting the demand for debt relief
AbstractEach year, millions of financially distressed consumers in the U.S. face a difficult choice among the debt relief options available to them. This paper describes the options available to borrowers who seek assistance in managing their debts and discusses the information and incentive problems associated with these options. It also reviews the trends that contributed to the breakdown of the repayment framework and the responses to these trends. Among the responses is a reconsideration of the regulatory structure of the debt relief industry. The paper concludes with a discussion of the importance for debt relief providers and policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of workout options and to develop a deeper understanding of how consumers make decisions about incurring and repaying debt.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper with number 11-04.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-22 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hellwig, Martin F, 1977. "A Model of Borrowing and Lending with Bankruptcy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(8), pages 1879-1906, November.
- Gropp, Reint & Scholz, John Karl & White, Michelle J, 1997.
"Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 217-51, February.
- Finkelstein, Amy, et al., 2011. "The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year," Working Paper Series rwp11-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 526-55, April.
- Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
- Amy Finkelstein & Sarah Taubman & Bill Wright & Mira Bernstein & Jonathan Gruber & Joseph P. Newhouse & Heidi Allen & Katherine Baicker & The Oregon Health Study Group, 2011.
"The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year,"
NBER Working Papers
17190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Amy Finkelstein & Sarah Taubman & Bill Wright & Mira Bernstein & Jonathan Gruber & Joseph P. Newhouse & Heidi Allen & Katherine Baicker, 2012. "The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1057-1106.
- Christopher J. Mayer & Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski & Arpit Gupta, 2011. "Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide," NBER Working Papers 17065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John M. Barron & Michael E. Staten, 2011. "Is technology-enhanced credit counseling as effective as in-person delivery?," Working Papers 11-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Robert M. Hunt, 2005. "Whither consumer credit counseling?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q4, pages 9-20.
- Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, 2011.
"Limited and varying consumer attention: evidence from shocks to the salience of bank overdraft fees,"
11-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, 2011. "Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees," NBER Working Papers 17028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bolton, Patrick, 1990. "Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 303-310, May.
- Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, 2002. "The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 168-207, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beth Paul).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.