Central bank transparency and the crowding out of private information in an experimental asset market
AbstractCentral banks have become increasingly communicative. An important reason is that democratic societies expect more transparency from public institutions. Central bankers, based on empirical research, also believe that sharing information has economic benefits. Communication is seen as a way to improve the predictability of monetary policy, thereby lowering financial market volatility and contributing to a more stable economy. However, a potential side-effect of providing costless public information is that market participants may be less inclined to invest in private information. Theoretical results suggest that this can hamper the ability of markets to predict future monetary policy. We test this in a laboratory asset market. Crowding out of information acquisition does indeed take place, but only where it is most pronounced does the predictive ability of the market deteriorate. Notable features of the experiment include a complex setup based directly on the theoretical model and the calibration of experimental parameters using empirical measurements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 487.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-03-26 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2011-03-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2011-03-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MON-2011-03-26 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007.
"The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2007. "The economic impact of central bank transparency: a survey," DNB Working Papers 132, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Cruijsen, C.A.B. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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