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Traders' broker choice, market liquidity and market structure

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Author Info
Sugato Chakravarty
Asani Sarkar

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Abstract

Hedgers and a risk-neutral informed trader choose between a broker who takes a position in the asset (a capital broker) and a broker who does not (a discount broker). The capital broker exploits order flow information to mimic informed trades and offset hedgers' trades, reducing informed profits and hedgers' utility. But the capital broker has a larger capacity to execute hedgers' orders, increasing market depth. In equilibrium, hedgers choose the broker with the lowest price per unit of utility while the informed trader chooses the broker with the lowest price per unit of the informed order flow. However, the chosen broker may not be the one with whom market depth and net order flow are higher. ; We relate traders' broker choice to market structure and show that the capital broker benefits customers relatively more in developed securities--i.e., markets where there are many hedgers with low levels of risk aversion and endowment risk, where the information precision is high and the asset volatility is low. The discount broker benefits customers relatively more in volatile markets where there are few hedgers with high levels of risk aversion and endowment volatility, and where information is imprecise. We derive testable predictions from our model and successfully explain up to 70 percent of the daily variation in the number of discount brokers and capital brokers (or, dual traders in futures markets).

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 28.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:28

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Keywords: Futures Securities Hedging (Finance) Liquidity (Economics)

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Thomas Gehrig, 1993. "Natural Oligopoly in Intermediated Markets," Discussion Papers 1027, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Fishman, Michael J & Longstaff, Francis A, 1992. " Dual Trading in Futures Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 643-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Spiegel, Matthew & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive Securities Market," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 307-29. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sanford J. Grossman, . "An Economic Analysis of Dual Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 33-89, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  6. Pagano, Marco, 1989. "Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 255-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Sarkar Asani, 1995. "Dual Trading: Winners, Losers, and Market Impact," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 77-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kandel, Eugene & Pearson, Neil D, 1995. "Differential Interpretation of Public Signals and Trade in Speculative Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 831-72, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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