Do Brokers Misallocate Customer Trades? Evidence From Futures Markets
AbstractIn the context of futures markets, we study whether brokers allocate more favorable trades to their own accounts, and less favorable trades to their customers. We find that, within a thirty minute trading bracket, brokers on average buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price for their own accounts relative to their customers. We show evidence that brokers' price advantage may be compensation for providing liquidity to the market when brokers trade for their own accounts, but no evidence that they are due to brokers' superior information, or to greater effort by brokers when trading for themselves. Consistent with the idea that, in a competitive market for brokerage services, brokers may pass on some of their profits to customers, we find that brokers who trade for themselves also provide superior execution for their customers, relative to brokers who do not trade for themselves.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 9801002.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 26 Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC; to print on HP Laserjet; pages: 41. Office for Futures and Options Research (OFOR) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Working Paper 98-01. For a complete list of OFOR working papers see
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futures; brokers; trading;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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