Loan servicer heterogeneity and the termination of subprime mortgages
AbstractAfter a mortgage is originated the borrower promises to make scheduled payments to repay the loan. These payments are sent to the loan servicer, who may be the original lender or some other firm. This firm collects the promised payments and distributes the cash flow (payments) to the appropriate investor/lender. A large data set (loan-level) of securitized subprime mortgages is used to examine if individual servicers are associated with systematic differences in mortgage performance (termination). While accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risk (default and prepay) proportional hazard framework, individual servicers are associated with substantial and economically meaningful impacts on loan termination.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2006-024.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-04-29 (Central Banking)
- NEP-REG-2006-04-29 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2006-04-29 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2005. "A dynamic look at subprime loan performance," Working Papers 2005-029, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- McCall, Brian P, 1996.
"Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and Part-Time Work,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 647-82, May.
- McCall, B.P., 1993. "Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and Part-Time Work," Papers 93-07, Minnesota - Industrial Relations Center.
- William P. Alexander & Scott D. Grimshaw & Grant R. McQueen & Barrett A. Slade, 2002. "Some Loans Are More Equal than Others: Third-Party Originations and Defaults in the Subprime Mortgage Industry," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 667-697.
- Pennington-Cross, Anthony, 2003. "Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 279-301, November.
- W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2009.
"Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Diffusion in Banking,"
09-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2009. "Technological change, financial innovation, and diffusion in banking," Working Paper 2009-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Pagès, Henri, 2013.
"Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
- Vikrant Vig & Amit Seru & Tomasz Piskorski, 2009.
"Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,"
2009 Meeting Papers
1169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.