On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources
AbstractRecent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2010.101.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Differential Games; non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria; Ecosystems; Optimal State-dependent Tax;
Other versions of this item:
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2010-10-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-10-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-10-02 (Public Finance)
- NEP-RES-2010-10-02 (Resource Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997.
"Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
- Wagener, F. O. O., 2003. "Skiba points and heteroclinic bifurcations, with applications to the shallow lake system," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1533-1561, July.
- Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & Zeeuw, A.J. de & Mäler, K-G., 2008.
"Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-378255, Tilburg University.
- Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A. & Mäler, K.-G., 2008. "Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1312-1331, April.
- Hein, Lars, 2006. "Cost-efficient eutrophication control in a shallow lake ecosystem subject to two steady states," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 429-439, October.
- Anne-Sophie Crépin & Therese Lindahl, 2009. "Grazing Games: Sharing Common Property Resources with Complex Dynamics," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 44(1), pages 29-46, September.
- Dechert, W.D. & O'Donnell, S.I., 2006. "The stochastic lake game: A numerical solution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(9-10), pages 1569-1587.
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