The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the field of environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a series of interesting results and useful insights, and is conveniently used here as a framework to explain the functioning of Joint Implementation programmes for polluting emissions’ reduction.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2009.80.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999.
"Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-49, November.
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