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Special Interests and Technological Change

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Author Info

  • Giorgio Bellettini

    (University of Bologna)

  • Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano

    (University of Bologna and CEPR)

Abstract

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintenance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying demographic, technological and preference parameters.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.59.

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Date of creation: Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.59

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Keywords: Technological change; Technology option; Pressure goups; Dynamic common agency;

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References

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  1. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  2. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  4. Krusell, P. & Rios-Rull, J.V., 1993. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Papers 547, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  5. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
  7. Grossman,G.M. & Helpman,E., 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governements," Papers 2-96, Tel Aviv.
  8. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
  9. Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1206, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
  12. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
  13. Edward C. Prescott, 1997. "Needed: a theory of total factor productivity," Staff Report 242, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  14. Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1992. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 942-63, September.
  15. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Toshihiko Mukoyama & Latchezar Popov, 2014. "The Political Economy of Entry Barriers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(3), pages 383-416, July.
  2. Lorenzo Burlon, 2014. "Public expenditure distribution, voting, and growth," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 961, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Igor D. Livshits & James C. MacGee, 2008. "Barriers to Technology Adoption and Entry," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20087, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  4. F. Lancia & G. Prarolo, 2007. "A Politico-Economic Model of Aging, Technology Adoption and Growth," Working Papers 590, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. Bilancini Ennio & D'Alessandro Simone, 2008. "Functional Distribution, Land Ownership and Industrial Takeoff: The Role of Effective Demand," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-36, August.
  6. G. Bellettini & C. Berti Ceroni, 2004. "A positive analysis of immigration policy," Working Papers 520, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. Lei Fang, 2010. "Entry Barriers, Financial Frictions, and Cross-Country Differences in Income and TFP," 2010 Meeting Papers 505, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Benjamin R. Bridgman & Igor D. Livshits & James C. MacGee, 2004. "For Sale: Barriers to Riches," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20043, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  9. Byeongju Jeong, 2007. "Intergenerational Bargaining in Technology Adoption," 2007 Meeting Papers 604, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Lei Fang, 2009. "Entry barriers, competition, and technology adoption," Working Paper 2009-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  11. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  12. Desmet, Klaus & Parente, Stephen, 2006. "Bigger is Better: Market Size, Demand Elasticity and Resistance to Technology Adoption," CEPR Discussion Papers 5825, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Jeong, Byeongju, 2014. "Economic growth in a politically fragmented world," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 402-416.
  14. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Lei Fang, 2010. "Entry cost, financial friction, and cross-country differences in income and TFP," Working Paper 2010-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  16. Maria Rosaria CARILLO & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2002. "The Enigma of Medieval Craft Guilds: A Model of Social Inertia and Technological Change," Working Papers 167, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  17. Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2004. "Unions and the political economy of immigration," 2004 Meeting Papers 494, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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