Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

An Estimation of the Inside Bank Premium

Contents:

Author Info

  • NEMOTO Tadanobu
  • OGURA Yoshiaki
  • WATANABE Wako

Abstract

This paper is an empirical examination of the existence of the inside bank premium arising from relationship banking, which is predicted in the extant theoretical models. These models predict that the contracted interest rate of a loan extended by an inside bank when there exist asymmetries between the inside bank and outside banks, such as the information advantage of the inside bank or the implicit insurance and other borrower-specific services exclusively provided by the inside bank, is higher than that without such asymmetries. Our statistical estimations are based on the dataset collected through the survey for small and medium-sized firms in Japan, which were designed to contain the questions about a firm's loan application process, and the agreed-upon loan terms that are crucial to our tests. Our estimations show that such an inside bank premium is 30-50 basis points on average for short-term loans. This is economically significant for the median short-term interest rate of 1.9 %. The subsample regressions show that this premium is more likely to come from the implicit insurance and that this premium is more significant for smaller inside banks in more competitive loan markets.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/11e067.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 11067.

as in new window
Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:11067

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 11th floor, Annex, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 1-3-1, Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8901
Phone: +81-3-3501-1363
Fax: +81-3-3501-8577
Email:
Web page: http://www.rieti.go.jp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ogura, Yoshiaki, 2010. "Interbank competition and information production: Evidence from the interest rate difference," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 279-304, April.
  2. Bester, H., 1990. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Discussion Paper 1990-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
  4. Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 1985. "Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(02), pages 211-229, June.
  5. Jo�O A. C. Santos & Andrew Winton, 2008. "Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1315-1359, 06.
  6. Cole, Rebel A., 1998. "The importance of relationships to the availability of credit," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 959-977, August.
  7. James J. Heckman, 1977. "Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System," NBER Working Papers 0177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan, 1997. "Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1592, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 475-506.
  11. Hirofumi Uchida & Gregory F.Udell & Wako Watanabe, 2007. "Bank Size and Lending Relationships in Japan," NBER Working Papers 13005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
  13. Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does Function Follow Organzizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1976, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  14. Galina Hale & Joao A. C. Santos, 2008. "Do banks price their informational monopoly?," Working Paper Series 2008-14, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  15. Elsas, Ralf, 2005. "Empirical determinants of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-57, January.
  16. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September.
  17. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  18. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
  19. Kim, Moshe & Kliger, Doron & Vale, Bent, 2003. "Estimating switching costs: the case of banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 25-56, January.
  20. Degryse, Hans & Van Cayseele, Patrick, 2000. "Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 90-109, January.
  21. Vasso Ioannidou & Steven Ongena, 2010. ""Time for a Change": Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1847-1877, October.
  22. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V & Udell, Gregory F, 1991. "Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(406), pages 458-72, May.
  23. Degryse, Hans & Ongena, Steven, 2007. "The impact of competition on bank orientation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-424, July.
  24. Enrica Detragiache & Paolo Garella & Luigi Guiso, 2000. "Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1133-1161, 06.
  25. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Ezra Friedman & Robert Marquez, 1999. "Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 515-534, Autumn.
  26. Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 967-1000.
  27. Wenying Jiangli & Haluk Unal & Chiwon Yom, 2008. "Relationship Lending, Accounting Disclosure, and Credit Availability during the Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 25-55, 02.
  28. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
  29. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
  30. Cole, Rebel A. & Goldberg, Lawrence G. & White, Lawrence J., 2004. "Cookie Cutter vs. Character: The Micro Structure of Small Business Lending by Large and Small Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(02), pages 227-251, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. HASUMI Ryo & HIRATA Hideaki & ONO Arito, 2011. "Differentiated Use of Small Business Credit Scoring by Relationship Lenders and Transactional Lenders: Evidence from firm-bank matched data in Japan," Discussion papers 11070, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:11067. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (NUKATANI Sorahiko).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.