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Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

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Author Info
Nicolas Gruyer () (LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC)
Abstract

This note extends Kreps and Scheinkman's result -showing that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game- to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

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File URL: http://gruyern.free.fr/wpaper/gruyerKSsub.pdf
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Paper provided by LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school) in its series Economics Working Papers with number 04.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:enc:abcdef:ks4

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Related research
Keywords: capacity; Bertrand competition; Kreps-Scheinkman; asymmetric costs.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1986. "Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Sougata Poddar, 1997. "Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 131-146. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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