Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising
AbstractThe aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncer-tainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam in its series ERIM Report Series Research in Management with number ERS-2010-017-ORG.
Date of creation: 26 Apr 2010
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More information through EDIRC
contractual completeness; franchising;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
- M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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- Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier, 2005. "Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements," NBER Working Papers 11292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mathias Dewatripont, 2006.
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9649, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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