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Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract

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  • Jean Beuve
  • Stéphane Saussier

Abstract

In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner's reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements. Copyright 2012 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Industrial and Corporate Change.

Volume (Year): 21 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 811-836

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Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:21:y:2012:i:4:p:811-836

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