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The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships

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  • Benjamin Klein

Abstract

[fre] Les contrats incomplets ne peuvent pas être expliqués en se fondant uniquement sur les effets incitatifs directs des termes du contrat. Le rôle joué par ces termes en matière d'auto-exécution de l'accord doit aussi être pris en considération. Afin d'économiser les coûts d'une multiplication des spécifications contractuelles, ces coûts incluant ceux de la trop grande rigidité des contrats explicites, les contractants stipulent des clauses d'incomplètude contractuelle qui leur permettent, après la signature du contrat, d'atteindre des niveaux satisfaisants de performances dans le plus grand nombre d'états du marché possible afin de garantir l'auto-exécution de l'accord. Les clauses d'incomplétudes contractuelles permettent de palier efficacement le caractère limité du capital réputation des parties. [eng] Incomplete contracts cannot be explained by focusing solely on the direct incentive effects of contract terms. The role of contract terms in facilitating self-enforcement must also be considered. Transactors avoid the costs of increased contractual specification, including the rigidity of explicit contracts, by using incomplete contract terms only to get close enough to desired performance so that the business relationship is self-enforcing over the broadest range of likely post-contract market conditions. Incomplete contract terms thereby efficiently complement transactors' limited reputational capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Klein, 2000. "The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 67-80.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_2000_num_92_1_1037
    DOI: 10.3406/rei.2000.1037
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.2000.1037
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    Cited by:

    1. Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2008. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," EIEF Working Papers Series 1022, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Dec 2010.
    2. Grosskopf Ofer & Medina Barak, 2007. "Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 321-361, August.
    3. Karantininis, Kostas & Graversen, Jesper T. & Rasmussen, Hans Jacob Nymann, 2008. "Relational Contracting and Allocation of Decision Rights in the Agri-Food Industry: Producer Contracts and Food Safety," 110th Seminar, February 18-22, 2008, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 49877, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
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    5. Matthias Fahn & Giorgio Zanarone, 2021. "Pay Transparency under Subjective Performance Evaluation," Economics working papers 2021-02, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
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    8. Дзагурова Наталия Борисовна, 2016. "Направления Повышения Привлекательности Лотерей, Сопряженных С Осуществлением Кооперативных Специфических Инвестиций," Journal of Institutional Studies Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 8(4), pages 53-71.
    9. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    10. Maria Bigoni & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Paola Valbonesi, 2010. "Sticks and Carrots in Procurement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0105, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    11. Sande, Jon Bingen & Haugland, Sven A., 2015. "Strategic performance effects of misaligned formal contracting: The mediating role of relational contracting," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 187-194.
    12. Contreras Oscar F. & Giorgio Zanarone, 2018. "Managing Social Comparison Costs in Organizations," Working Papers 2018-25, Banco de México.
    13. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.
    14. Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Windsperger, J., 2010. "Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2010-017-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    15. Giorgio Zanarone & Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo & Tammy L. Madsen, 2016. "The double-edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre-existing resources," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2104-2120, October.
    16. Maloney, Michael T., 2017. "Alchian remembrances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 561-582.
    17. Yannick Perez, 2006. "La gestion de l'incertitude et de l'opportunisme dans les décisions publiques Les enseignements des réformes électriques concurrentielles," Post-Print hal-04297587, HAL.
    18. Raphaël Homayoun Boroumand & Georg Zachmann, 2015. "Risk hedging and competition : the case of electricity markets," EcoMod2015 8491, EcoMod.
    19. Baker, George P. & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J., 2008. "Strategic alliances: Bridges between "islands of conscious power"," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 146-163, June.
    20. Aldashev, Gani & Zanarone, Giorgio, 2017. "Endogenous enforcement institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 49-64.
    21. Boroumand, Raphaël Homayoun & Zachmann, Georg, 2012. "Retailers' risk management and vertical arrangements in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 465-472.
    22. Todd M. Alessandri & Anju Seth, 2014. "The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(13), pages 2064-2075, December.
    23. Daniel Barron & Robert Gibbons & Ricard Gil & Kevin J.Murphy, 2020. "Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1868-1889, May.
    24. Hanning Li & Hongyun Han & Shiyu Ying, 2022. "Reputation Effect on Contract Choice and Self-Enforcement: A Case Study of Farmland Transfer in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-23, August.

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