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Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures

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  • J. Windsperger

    (Department of Management, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria)

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    Abstract

    Previous studies in organizational economics and international business research have not tested a property rights view on the allocation of decision rights (DR) in joint ventures (JVs). The paper offers a test of the property rights explanation by using data from Hungarian JVs. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more important the JV partner's intangible knowledge assets for the generation of residual surplus, the more residual DR are assigned to him. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1464
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

    Volume (Year): 30 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 8 ()
    Pages: 491-501

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    Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:491-501

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    Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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