Analyse spatiale du pouvoir de vote : application au cas de l'intercommunalité dans le département du Val d'Oise
AbstractThe spatial analysis of power indices is commonly used in the literature to study the importance of ideological criteria. Our purpose is to show, through the example of some french groupings of local cities, the importance of the geographical situation of the players when considering power analysis. We show that the classical measure of power (with the Shapley-Shubik index of power) may be sometimes radically different if the geographical aspect of the player is taken into account (with the Shapley-Owen index of power).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-17.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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Shapley-Shubik index of power; french grouping of local cities; spatial analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2006-11-18 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-GTH-2006-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-URE-2006-11-18 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier.
- Shenoy, Prakash P., 1982. "The Banzhaf power index for political games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 299-315, April.
- Leech, D., 2000.
"An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
563, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dennis Leech, 2002. "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, 03.
- F. Barthélémy & M. Martin, 2005. "Répartition des sièges au sein des structures intercommunales du Val d’Oise," THEMA Working Papers 2005-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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