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Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes toward redistribution

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  • Lopez, Matias
  • Moraes Silva, Graziella
  • Teeger, Chana
  • Marques, Pedro

Abstract

Previous studies have posited that elites are willing to advance the redistribution of income and social goods when the negative effects of inequality, such as crime and conflict, threaten their own interests. Although elites acknowledge these negative effects, their support for redistributive policies remains low throughout the Global South. We address this paradox using a multi-method research design. Drawing on 56 in-depth interviews with Brazilian political and economic elites, we document how, when discussing the negative effects of inequality, interviewees consistently characterized the poor as ignorant, irrational and politically incompetent. We use these findings to theorize about the negative impact of such perceptions of the poor on elite support for redistribution. We then test this relationship using survey data gathered from random samples of political and economic elites in Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay (N = 544). We find the relationship to be robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Lopez, Matias & Moraes Silva, Graziella & Teeger, Chana & Marques, Pedro, 2022. "Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes toward redistribution," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 104273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:104273
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104273/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan A. Bogliaccini & Juan Pablo Luna, 2016. "Deflecting my burden, hindering redistribution: How elites influence tax legislation in Latin America," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Working Paper w, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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    4. Alberto F. Alesina & Paola Giuliano, 2009. "Preferences for Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 14825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    6. Katz, Michael B., 2013. "The Undeserving Poor: America's Enduring Confrontation with Poverty: Fully Updated and Revised," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199933952.
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    12. Feierherd, German & Schiumerini, Luis & Stokes, Susan, 2020. "When Do the Wealthy Support Redistribution? Inequality Aversion in Buenos Aires," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 793-805, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fastenrath, Florian & Marx, Paul, 2023. "The role of preference formation and perception in unequal representation: Combined evidence from elite interviews and focus groups in Germany," ifso working paper series 26, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Socioeconomics (ifso).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elites; inequality; perceptions; social policy; redistribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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