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Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

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  • Hopkins, Ed

Abstract

This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers an evolutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is sufficiently low. Thus, the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

Suggested Citation

  • Hopkins, Ed, 2011. "Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour," SIRE Discussion Papers 2011-29, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:270
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/270
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tamminen, Saara, 2014. "Varying markups and income inequality in an open economy," Conference papers 332437, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    2. Nguyen, Van-Quy, 2021. "Endowment-regarding preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Kontogiannis, Nikolaos & Litina, Anastasia & Varvarigos, Dimitrios, 2019. "Occupation-induced status, social norms, and economic growth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 348-360.
    4. Chen, Xi, 2017. "Does Daughter Deficit Promote Parental Substance Use? Longitudinal Evidence on Smoking from Rural China," IZA Discussion Papers 10860, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Van Quy Nguyen, 2020. "Endowments-regarding preferences," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02966848, HAL.
    6. Fafchamps, Marcel & Kebede, Bereket & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2015. "Keep up with the winners: Experimental evidence on risk taking, asset integration, and peer effects," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 59-79.
    7. Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Dynamic Competitive Persuasion," Papers 1811.11664, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    8. Van Quy Nguyen, 2020. "Endowments-regarding preferences," Post-Print halshs-02966848, HAL.
    9. Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests," Papers 2108.13506, arXiv.org.
    10. Van Quy Nguyen, 2020. "Endowments-regarding preferences," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    11. Dietmar Fehr & Yannick Reichlin, 2021. "Status, Control Beliefs, and Risk-Taking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9253, CESifo.
    12. Chen, Xi, 2017. "Do Skewed Sex Ratios Among Children Promote Parental Smoking? Longitudinal Evidence from Rural China," GLO Discussion Paper Series 159, Global Labor Organization (GLO).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    risk; status; inequality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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