AbstractThis paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. We characterize the set of optimal constitutional rules under different assumptions about the degree of contractual imperfections. Our model explains why constitutions contain different types of rules. In particular, we derive conditions under which it is optimal, in addition to a standard decision rule (e.g., simple majority), to introduce veto rules (that block certain types of decisions) and supermajority rules (that allow the veto rule to be overruled). Our model also explains the existence of amendment rules and checks and balances
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Constitutions; constitutional design; social contracts; majority rules; amendments; checks and balances;
Other versions of this item:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D - Microeconomics
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- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
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