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La Constitution européenne est 50,13 %-stable. Une note comparative sur la stabilité des Constitutions

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  • Nicolas Houy
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    Abstract

    We define the stability indice of a Constitution obtained by Partial Culture. We will say that a Constitution is α-stable if it changes with a probability 1/2 when each individual shows a will to change it with a probability α. We compute that the European Constitution is 50,13 %-stable whereas the French Constitution is 50,07 %-stable.Classification JEL : D71, D72.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 123-134

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    Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_571_0123

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    Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm

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    1. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Scholarly Articles 4554123, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 2004.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson, 2000. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," Working Papers 57, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
    5. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
    6. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Tuerlinckx, Francis, 2002. "The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power," Working Papers 1141, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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