IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecl/illbus/07-0110.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Firms Make Unilateral Investments Specific to Other Firms: The Case of OEM Suppliers

Author

Listed:
  • Kang, Min-Ping

    (Shih Hsin U)

  • Mahoney, Joseph T.

    (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

  • Tan, Danchi

    (National Chengchi U)

Abstract

This paper examines why and under what conditions firms will make unilateral relationship-specific investments to serve their transaction partners. We propose that firms are more likely to make unilateral relationship-specific investments when the investment yields economic spillover values for other transactions with the same exchange partners as well as for third-party transactions. We also model two types of positive inter-project spillover effects that a transaction may generate: knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. We find empirical support for our developed theory in the context of Taiwanese suppliers of Original Equipment Manufacturers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kang, Min-Ping & Mahoney, Joseph T. & Tan, Danchi, 2007. "Why Firms Make Unilateral Investments Specific to Other Firms: The Case of OEM Suppliers," Working Papers 07-0110, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:07-0110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.business.illinois.edu/Working_Papers/papers/07-0110.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anne Parmigiani, 2007. "Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of concurrent sourcing," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 285-311, March.
    2. Toby E. Stuart, 2000. "Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: a study of growth and innovation rates in a high‐technology industry," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 791-811, August.
    3. Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, 1994. "Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 549-566, May.
    4. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    5. Armstrong, J. Scott & Overton, Terry S., 1977. "Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," MPRA Paper 81694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jérôme Barthélemy & Bertrand V. Quélin, 2006. "Complexity of Outsourcing Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(8), pages 1775-1797, December.
    7. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    8. Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, 1995. "Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 373-392.
    9. Kirti Sawhney Celly & Robert E Spekman & John W Kamauff, 1999. "Technological Uncertainty, Buyer Preferences and Supplier Assurances: An Examination of Pacific Rim Purchasing Arrangements," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 30(2), pages 297-316, June.
    10. M. Bensaou & Erin Anderson, 1999. "Buyer-Supplier Relations in Industrial Markets: When Do Buyers Risk Making Idiosyncratic Investments?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 460-481, August.
    11. James Richardson, 1996. "Vertical Integration and Rapid Response in Fashion Apparel," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 400-412, August.
    12. Kentaro Nobeoka & Jeffrey H Dyer & Anoop Madhok, 2002. "The Influence of Customer Scope on Supplier Learning and Performance in the Japanese Automobile Industry," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 33(4), pages 717-736, December.
    13. Glenn Hoetker, 2005. "How much you know versus how well I know you: selecting a supplier for a technically innovative component," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 75-96, January.
    14. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    15. Raji Srinivasan & Thomas H. Brush, 2006. "Supplier Performance in Vertical Alliances: The Effects of Self-Enforcing Agreements and Enforceable Contracts," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 436-452, August.
    16. Kyle J. Mayer & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2004. "Are Supply and Plant Inspections Complements or Substitutes? A Strategic and Operational Assessment of Inspection Practices in Biotechnology," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(8), pages 1064-1081, August.
    17. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    18. Masaaki Kotabe & Xavier Martin & Hiroshi Domoto, 2003. "Gaining from vertical partnerships: knowledge transfer, relationship duration, and supplier performance improvement in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 293-316, April.
    19. Dieter Ernst, 2000. "Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing: What Permits Small Taiwanese Firms to Compete in the Computer Industry?," Economics Study Area Working Papers 01, East-West Center, Economics Study Area.
    20. Jack A. Nickerson & Brian S. Silverman, 2003. "Why aren't all Truck Drivers Owner‐Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for‐hire Trucking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 91-118, March.
    21. Hoetker, Glenn, 2002. "How Much You Know versus How Well I Know You: Selecting a Supplier for a Technically Innovative Component," Working Papers 02-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guillem Roig, 2018. "Investment and Market Structure in Common Agency Games," Documentos de Trabajo 16203, Universidad del Rosario.
    2. Andrew B. Bernard & Andreas Moxnes & Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, 2018. "Two-Sided Heterogeneity and Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(3), pages 424-439, July.
    3. Roig, Guillem, 2014. "What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co," TSE Working Papers 14-482, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xue, Jinjie & Yuan, Hongping & Shi, Benshan, 2016. "Investigating partners' opportunistic behavior in joint ventures in China: The role of transaction costs and relational exchanges," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 6067-6078.
    2. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel, 2010. "Indefinite contract duration: Evidence from electronics subcontracting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 145-159, June.
    3. Moeen, Mahka & Somaya, Deepak & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2011. "Supply Portfolio Concentration in Outsourced Knowledge-Based Services," Working Papers 11-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    4. Mahka Moeen & Deepak Somaya & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2013. "Supply Portfolio Concentration in Outsourced Knowledge-Based Services," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 262-279, February.
    5. Alex Eapen & Rekha Krishnan, 2019. "Transferring Tacit Know-How: Do Opportunism Safeguards Matter for Firm Boundary Decisions?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 715-734, July.
    6. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
    7. Huo, Baofeng & Ye, Yuxiao & Zhao, Xiande, 2015. "The impacts of trust and contracts on opportunism in the 3PL industry: The moderating role of demand uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PA), pages 160-170.
    8. Huo, Baofeng & Ye, Yuxiao & Zhao, Xiande & Wei, Jiang & Hua, Zhongsheng, 2018. "Environmental uncertainty, specific assets, and opportunism in 3PL relationships: A transaction cost economics perspective," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 154-163.
    9. Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2020. "Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 1011-1031, April.
    10. De Vita, Glauco & Tekaya, Arafet & Wang, Catherine L., 2010. "Asset specificity's impact on outsourcing relationship performance: A disaggregated analysis by buyer-supplier asset specificity dimensions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(7), pages 657-666, July.
    11. Mari Sako & George Chondrakis & Paul M. Vaaler, 2016. "How Do Plural-Sourcing Firms Make and Buy? The Impact of Supplier Portfolio Design," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 1161-1182, October.
    12. Lokshin, Boris & Hagedoorn, John & Letterie, Wilko, 2011. "The bumpy road of technology partnerships: Understanding causes and consequences of partnership mal-functioning," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 297-308, March.
    13. Delbufalo, Emanuela, 2021. "Asset specificity and relationship performance: A meta-analysis over three decades," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 105-121.
    14. Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(4), pages 811-836, August.
    15. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2010. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-004, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2012.
    16. Yeung, Kwong & Cheng, T.C.E. & Lee, Peter K.C., 2015. "Buyers’ perceptions on the impact of strategic purchasing on dyadic quality performances," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 321-330.
    17. Janet Bercovitz & Sandy D. Jap & Jack A. Nickerson, 2006. "The Antecedents and Performance Implications of Cooperative Exchange Norms," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(6), pages 724-740, December.
    18. Richard Carter, 2012. "Transaction Cost Empirical Work," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Teryokhin Sergei & Hannås Gøril, 2017. "Pre-requisites of successful strategic electronic coordination: the moderation effect of the ownership mechanism of inter-organisational information systems," Engineering Management in Production and Services, Sciendo, vol. 9(4), pages 34-47, December.
    20. Cannavale, Chiara & Esempio, Anna & Ferretti, Marco, 2021. "Up- and down- alliances: A systematic literature review," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(5).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:07-0110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbuiuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.