Random walks and voting theory
AbstractVoters' preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 753.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2002
Date of revision:
voting theory; quotas; random walks;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1995.
"Case-Based Decision Theory,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 605-39, August.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille, 2004.
"Majority vote following a debate,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 115-125, 08.
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