Threat Perceptions in Europe: Domestic Terrorism and International Crime
AbstractThis paper focuses on two areas of security concern for the European Union: terrorism and international crime. I present a model of game-theoretic interaction between a European state and a domestic dissident group, who, on occasion, may resort to acts of terrorism. Here, identity is crucial to the putative terrorist, providing the microfoundations of dissident group behaviour by solving the collective action problem. I also sketch a macromodel of drugs production in a conflict-ridden developing country, where I argue that demand-side policies of regulation may be better than policies that are aimed at eradicating supply. As far as the policy implications are concerned, first excessive deterrence against potential terrorists may backfire. Secondly, space needs to be created so that Muslim migrants are able to merge their personal identities within their adopted European homelands. Thirdly, the economic discrimination against Muslims in Europe needs to be redressed. Finally, aid to fragile drug producing states should be broad-based and poverty reducing, not just benefiting warlords.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Economics of Security Working Paper Series with number 2.
Length: 15 p.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
European Security; Conflict; Terrorism; Narcotics Trade;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
- Edward L. Glaeser, 2002.
"The Political Economy of Hatred,"
NBER Working Papers
9171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
- Michael Brzoska & Raphael Bossong & Eric van Um, 2011. "Security Economics in the European Context: Implications of the EUSECON Project," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 58, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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