Violent Groups and Police Tactics: Should Tear Gas Make Crime Preventers Cry?
AbstractDemocratic societies are challenged by various violent and organized groups, be they terrorists, gangs or organized hooligans. In exchange for offering an identity, leaders in such groups typically require members to be violent. We introduce a simple model to capture these stylized facts, and then study the effects of policing. We find that an increase in the marginal cost of violence always reduces violence, while increasing the indiscriminate fixed cost may backfire and result in smaller and more violent groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1639.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
violence; terrorism; gangs; hooliganism; supporter clubs;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
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