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Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations

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Abstract

There is a large potential for improving individual risk management through new risk management contracts and associated new index-settled derivatives. However, there are some difficult problems in designing contracts so that they will be used effectively. Individuals have idiosyncratic individual risks that can be hedged only at some real resource cost due to moral hazard. Individuals seem to exhibit behavior indicative of lack of appreciation of the principles of risk management. These problems are discussed, and some potential new risk management contracts that would make improvements in the management of major income risks are proposed.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d11a/d1145.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1145.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Notes (1997), 26(2): 361-378
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1145

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  1. Stefano G. Athanasoulis & Robert J. Shiller, 1997. "The Significance of the Market Portfolio," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1154, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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Cited by:
  1. Wagner, W.B., 2000. "Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper 2000-92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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