Patent Protection, Technological Change and Wage Inequality: Theory
AbstractWe develop a directed-technological-change model to address the issue of the optimal patent system and investigate how the optimal patent system influences the direction of technological change and the inequality of wage, where patents are categorized as skill- and labor-complementary. The major results are: (i) Finite patent breadth maximizes the social welfare level; (ii) Optimal patent breadth increases with the amount of skilled (unskilled) workers; (iii) Optimal patent protection is skill-biased, because an increase in the amount of skilled workers increases the dynamic benefits of the protection for skill-complementary patents via the economy of scale of skill-complementary technology; (iv) Skill-biased patent protection skews inventions towards skills, thus increasing wage inequality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics in its series CEMA Working Papers with number 537.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Patent Breadth; Skill-Biased Patent Protection; Skill-Biased Technological Change; Wage Inequality; Economic Growth;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2012-03-14 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2012-03-14 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAB-2012-03-14 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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