AbstractWe propose a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call pyramidal values. Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely, we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. To be specific, we consider some parametric families of pyramidal values: the egalitarian pyramidal family, which coincides with the a-consensus value family introduced by Ju et al. in (2007), the proportional pyramidal family, and the weighted pyramidal family, which in turn includes the other two families as special cases. We also analyze the properties of these families, as well as their relationships with other previously defined values.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría in its series Statistics and Econometrics Working Papers with number ws122418.
Date of creation: Oct 2012
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Game theory; TU games; Pyramidal values; Consensus values;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-11-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-11-24 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-11-24 (Microeconomics)
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