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A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio

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Author Info

  • Carlos Osório

    ()
    (Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • Paulo Maçãs

    ()
    (Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • João Leitão

    ()
    (Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior)

Abstract

This paper aims at the comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg pricings for a durable good, assuming time as a continuous variable. It concludes that the Cournot's strategic conduct is better for the duopoly producers than the Stackelberg's leader. This conclusion, however, does not prevail for the first stage, although it does for the remaining. Whether one of the producers acts as a leader, the satellite rival will respond in such a way that the price approaches, in a very short time, the marginal cost. For the remaining stages, but the first one, irrespective of the risk level and the strategic conduct taken, Cournot's model implies a stable equilibrium, based on higher Cournot's profits than Stackelberg's profits.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade da Beira Interior, Departamento de Gestão e Economia (Portugal) in its series Working Papers de Gestão, Economia e Marketing (Management, Economics and Marketing Working Papers) with number 6/2001.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:csh:wpecon:6/2001

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Keywords: Duopoly; Durable; Price; Profit;

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  1. Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1984. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," Discussion Papers 675, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Karp, Larry, 1996. "Depreciation erodes the Coase Conjecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 473-490, February.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April.
  4. Driskill, Robert, 2001. "Durable goods oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 391-413, March.
  5. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
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