Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken games?
AbstractDuring the recent financial crisis many countries resorted to protectionist measures to try to boost demand for domestically-produced goods. In this paper we explore the extent to which the adoption of protectionist measures led to retaliation by other countries undermining the increase in demand. We found no evidence of retaliation. On the contrary, there is strong evidence of chicken-games being played. Indeed, the probability of a protectionist measure being imposed on a trading partner's export bundle is significantly smaller when the partner imposes a protectionist measure on home exports.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9119.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Boffa, Mauro & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2012. "Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken-games?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 746-749.
- Mauro Boffa & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Protectionism during the crisis: Tic-for-tac or chicken-games?," Research Papers by the Department of Economics, University of Geneva 12034, Département des Sciences Économiques, Université de Genève.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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