Trading Fees and Efficiency in Limit Order Markets
AbstractWe study competition between a dealer (OTC) market and a limit order market. In the limit order market, investors can choose to be "makers" (post limit orders) or "takers" (hit limit orders) whereas in the dealer market they must trade at dealers' quotes. Moreover, in the limit order market, investors pay a trading fee to the operator of this market ("the matchmaker"). We show that an increase in the matchmaker's trading fee can raise investors' ex-ante expected welfare. Actually, it induces makers to post more aggressive offers and thereby it raises the likelihood of a direct trade between investors. For this reason as well, a reduction in the matchmaker's trading fee can counter-intuitively raise the OTC market share. However, entry of a new matchmaker results in an improvement in investors' welfare, despite its negative effect on trading fees. The model has testable implications for the effects of a change in trading fees and their breakdown between makers and takers on various measures of market liquidity.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8395.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- Jean-Edouard Colliard & Thierry Foucault, 2012. "Trading Fees and Efficiency in Limit Order Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(11), pages 3389-3421.
- G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2008. "Competition between Exchanges: Lessons from the Battle of the Bund," CEPR Discussion Papers 6923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2011.
"Competition between exchanges: A research agenda,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 329-336, May.
- Thierry Foucault & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2013.
"Liquidity Cycles and Make/Take Fees in Electronic Markets,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 299-341, 02.
- Foucault, Thierry & Kadan, Ohad & Kandel, Eugene, 2009. "Liquidity cycles and make/take fees in electronic markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 7551, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Foucault, Thierry & Kadan, Ohad & Kandel, Eugene, 2009. "Liquidity cycles and make/take fees in electronic markets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 920, HEC Paris.
- Foucault, Thierry & Menkveld, Albert, 2006.
"Competition for order flow and smart order routing systems,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
831, HEC Paris.
- Thierry Foucault & Albert J. Menkveld, 2008. "Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order Routing Systems," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(1), pages 119-158, 02.
- Foucault, Thierry & Menkveld, Albert J., 2006. "Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order Routing Systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 5523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1993.
"Intermediation in Search Markets,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
- Degryse, Hans & Van Achter, Mark & Wuyts, Gunther, 2012.
"Internalization, clearing and settlement, and liquidity,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/335865, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Degryse, Hans & Van Achter, Mark & Wuyts, Gunther, 2012. "Internalization, Clearing and Settlement, and Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 8765, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Degryse, H.A. & Achter, M. van & Wuyts, G., 2012. "Internalization, Clearing and Settlement, and Liquidity," Discussion Paper 2012-001, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Degryse, H.A. & Achter, M. van & Wuyts, G., 2012. "Internalization, Clearing and Settlement, and Liquidity," Discussion Paper 2012-002, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hoffmann, Peter, 2012. "A dynamic limit order market with fast and slow traders," MPRA Paper 39855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.