Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the US
Abstract
Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow down multilateral trade liberalization, i.e. whether they are a ‘building block’ or a ‘stumbling block’ to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on US tariff reductions during the most recent multilateral trade round to provide the first systematic evidence that the US’s PTAs were a stumbling block to its multilateral liberalization. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions that amplify the stumbling block effect.Download Info
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4884.
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Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4884
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Related research
Keywords: MFN tariff concessions; multilateral trade negotiations; preferential trade agreements; reciprocity;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2005-06-14 (International Trade)
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Hoekman. Bernard & Prowse, Susan, 2005. "Economic policy responses to preference erosion : from trade as aid toaid for trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3721, The World Bank.
- John Romalis, 2007.
"NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
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"Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5045, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Limao, Nuno & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2005. "Trade preferences to small developing countries and the welfare costs of lost multilateral liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3565, The World Bank.
- Paolo Epifani & Gino Gancia, 2008.
"Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade,"
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iewwp359, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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- Nuno Lim, 2006. "Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 896-914, June.
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