Suppose an altruistic person - A - is willing to transfer resources to a second person - B - if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents’ point of view. This is the Samaritan’s dilemma. The logic of the dilemma has been employed in an extensive literature, addressing a wide range of both normative and positive issues. This Paper shows, however, that the under-saving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information. The reason for this is that if A is uncertain about how big B’s need for support is, B will have an incentive to signal that they are in great need by saving more that they otherwise would have done.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3842.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)