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Le financement des infrastructures de transport dans les régions périphériques. Une approche par les choix publics

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  • Alain Marciano
  • Xavier Peraldi

Abstract

[eng] The private financing of transportation infrastructures is not suitable for peri­pheral areas because of too low profitability prospects. Though being essential, public intervention efficiency is limited by strategic behaviors from users, statuary companis and politicians in office too. Our paper develops a solution based on a combined use of public and private resources which overcome the above-mentio­ned limits thereby allowing an optimal allocation of resources. Firstly, infrastructu­res are financed by public funds ; secondly, their exploitation is ensured by private companies ; thirdly, peripheral areas inhabitants are provided with a financial com­pensation. [fre] Les infrastructures de transport des régions périphériques ne peuvent être, pour des raisons de rentabilité insuffisante, financées à partir de fonds privés. L'implication financière des autorités publiques apparaît alors indispensable. Cependant l'efficacité d'une telle solution est limitée par l'incapacité de l'Etat de prévenir la manipulation des fonds versés. L'article étudie les comportements stratégiques des usagers, des sociétés d'exploitation mais aussi des autorités et présente une solution fondée sur un financement mixte (privé-public). L'Etat finance l'infrastructure, l'exploitation et les résidents bénéficient d'une compensa­tion financière susceptible de soutenir leur demande de transport.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Marciano & Xavier Peraldi, 1997. "Le financement des infrastructures de transport dans les régions périphériques. Une approche par les choix publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(2), pages 257-270.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_2_409874
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1997.409874
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409874
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    References listed on IDEAS

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