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Resolving Debt Crises: An Historical Perspective

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  • Eichengreen, Barry

Abstract

Two general approaches have been offered for dealing with the developing country debt crisis: the first proposes continued reliance on case-by-case negotiation, while the second involves global plans for fundamentally restructuring the terms of international lending and repayment. Both approaches have precedents in earlier periods. In the 1930s, for instance, when some two-thirds of foreign dollar bonds lapsed into default, several global schemes for resolving the crisis were under consideration even while individual debtor-creditor negotiations were in progress. In the end no global plan was adopted and the debt crisis of the 1930s was resolved by the `muddling-through' approach of case-by-case negotiation. The experience of the 1930s suggests two questions concerning the efficacy of the two approaches. First, what stumbling blocks stand in the way of the adoption of global schemes? Second, as a crisis drags on, how does the evolution of debtor and creditor strategies permit it to be resolved through bilateral negotiations? In this paper historical evidence from the interwar period is used to address these questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichengreen, Barry, 1988. "Resolving Debt Crises: An Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:239
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stanley Fischer, 1987. "Resolving the International Debt Crisis," NBER Working Papers 2373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1986. "The Anatomy of Financial Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 130, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Portes,, 1987. "Threats to International Financial Stability," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521347891.
    4. Barry Eichengreen, 1986. "The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff," NBER Working Papers 2001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dufrénot, G. & Triki, K., 2012. "Why have governments succeeded in reducing French public debt historically and can these successes inspired us for the future? An historical perspective since 1890," Working papers 386, Banque de France.
    2. Mortimore, Michael & Stanley, Leonardo, 2006. "Has investor protection been rendered obsolete by the Argentine crisis?," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), April.
    3. Gundlach, Erich & Scheide, Joachim & Sinn, Stefan, 1990. "Die Entwicklung nationaler Auslandsvermögenspositionen: Konsequenzen für die Wirtschaftspolitik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 414, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Sebastian Edwards, 1988. "The Debt Crisis and Economic Adjustment in Latin America," UCLA Economics Working Papers 531, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Siebert, Horst, 1989. "Güterwirtschaftliche Anpassungsprozesse zur Lösung der Verschuldungsfrage," Kiel Working Papers 349, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    Keywords

    Debt; Default;

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