School tracking, social segregation and educational opportunity: evidence from Belgium
AbstractEducational tracking is a very controversial issue in education. The tracking debate is about the virtues of uniformity and vertical differentiation in the curriculum and teaching. The pro-tracking group claims that curriculum and teaching better aimed at children's varied interest and skills will foster learning efficacy. The anti-tracking group claims that tracking systems are inefficient and unfair because they hinder learning and distribute learning inequitably. In this paper we provide a detailed within-country analysis of a specific educational system with a long history of early educational tracking between schools, namely the Flemish secondary school system in Belgium. This is interesting place to look because it provides a remarkable mix of excellence and inequality. Indeed the Flemish school system is repeatedly one of the best performer in the international harmonized PISA tests in math, science and reading; whereas it produces some of the most unequal distributions of learning between schools and students. Combining evidence from the PISA 2006 data set at the student and school level with recent statistical methods, we show first the dramatic impact of tracking on social segregation; and then, the impact of social segregation on equality of educational opportunity (adequately measured). It is shown that tracking, via social segregation, has a major effect on inequality of opportunity. Children of different economic classes will have different access to knowledge.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010081.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
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tracking; ability grouping; educational performance; social segregation; inequality; PISA;
Other versions of this item:
- J. Hindriks & M. Verschelde & G. Rayp & K. Schoors, 2010. "School tracking, social segregation and educational opportunity: evidence from Belgium," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 10/690, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2011-02-12 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2011-02-12 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-02-12 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-33, February.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- School tracking, social segregation and educational opportunity: evidence from Belgium
by Kevin Denny in Geary Behaviour Centre on 2011-02-22 22:45:00
- VERSCHELDE, Marijn & HINDRIKS, Jean & RAYP, Glenn & SCHOORS, Koen, 2012. "School staff autonomy and educational performance: within school type evidence," CORE Discussion Papers 2012053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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