This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Can Tax Reform Work in an Economy Where Tax Avoidance and Evasion are Endemic?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Edimon Ginting
Abstract

In this model firms seek to minimise their tax liabilities by purchasing rent-seeking services from a provider who also sells legitimate public services to the government. The provider enjoys economies of scope - its two outputs are produced jointly. Tax reform in this setting can increase both government revenue and the efficiency of the economy because a type of Laffer curve is operational and because such reform can lead to resources being moved out of rent-seeking activity. Later this partial equilibrium framework will be embedded within a conventional general equilibrium model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/ftp/workpapr/ip-71.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Monash University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre in its series Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers with number ip-71.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cop:wpaper:ip-71

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 11th Floor, Menzies Building, Wellington Road, Clayton, Victoria, 3168
Phone: 03 9905 2398
Fax: 03 9905 2426
Web page: http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark Horridge).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Jung, Young H. & Snow, Arthur & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Tax evasion and the size of the underground economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 391-402, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1980. "Lobbying and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 355-363, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Don Fullerton, 1982. "On the Possibility of an Inverse Relationship between Tax Rates and Government Revenues," NBER Working Papers 0467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.