Este artículo describe el modelo de regulación de costos con completa información y el modelo de Baron y Myerson de regulación de monopolios naturales con selección adversa dentro de un esquema de principal-agente en su versión discreta de dos tipos. El modelo resalta las distorsiones causadas por las rentas de información que el agente obtiene debido a que el regulador no conoce el verdadero parámetro de costos marginales de la firma. ************************************************************************* This paper analyses the model of cost regulation with complete information and the Baron & Myerson model of natural monopoly regulation with adverse selection based on a discrete, two types, principal-agent scheme. The model highlights the distortions caused by information rents gained by the agent due to the regulator does not know the firm's marginal costs.
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Paper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA in its series BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN with number
003442.
Length: 18 Date of creation: 03 Apr 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:col:000091:003442
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