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On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises

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  • Jack Hirshleifer

    (UCLA)

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp337.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 337.

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    Date of creation: 01 Aug 1984
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:337

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    Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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    1. Friedman, David, 1980. "Many, Few, One: Social Harmony and the Shrunken Choice Set," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 225-32, March.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1977. "Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 500-502, June.
    3. Coase, R H, 1976. "Adam Smith's Views of Man," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 529-46, October.
    4. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    5. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
    6. Thompson, Earl A & Faith, Roger L, 1981. "A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 366-80, June.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. A few thoughts on the last 24 hours without all the facts
      by rhmurphy in Increasing Marginal Utility (Tom Bozzo) on 2013-04-19 19:50:07
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    Cited by:
    1. Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta & Daniel Sznycer, 2012. "Building and Rebuilding Trust with Promises and Apologies," Working Papers 12-19, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Territorial Bargaining," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 343., Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Paolo Pinotti, 2009. "Trust and Regulation: Addressing a Cultural Bias," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 721, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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