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Strategic Redistricting

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Author Info
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Faruk Gul

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Abstract

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000351.

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Date of creation: 08 Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000351

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gilligan, Thomas W & Matsusaka, John G, 1999. " Structural Constraints on Partisan Bias under the Efficient Gerrymander," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 65-84, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 113-44, March.
  4. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. " How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 27-49, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Katz, Jonathan N. & Cox, Gary W., 1997. "The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections," Working Papers 1011, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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