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How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis

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  • Sherstyuk, K.

Abstract

This paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the 'fair cake division' results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. The author analyzes existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, she finds that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sherstyuk, K., 1995. "How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 469, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:469
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aranson, Peter H. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1974. "Election Goals and Strategies: Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 135-152, March.
    2. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm," Working Papers 92-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. M. L. BALINSKI & H. P. Young, 1982. "Fair Representation in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 361-373, June.
    4. Berliant, Marcus & Thomson, William & Dunz, Karl, 1992. "On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-216.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bracco, Emanuele, 2013. "Optimal districting with endogenous party platforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-13.
    2. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "Strategic Redistricting," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. repec:lan:wpaper:1711 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Xiaotie Deng & Qi Qi & Amin Saberi, 2012. "Algorithmic Solutions for Envy-Free Cake Cutting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(6), pages 1461-1476, December.
    5. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
    6. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Strategic Redistricting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-1641, September.
    7. Corbett A. Grainger, 2010. "Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 545-567.
    8. Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why "pack and crack" does not work," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 93-96, October.
    9. repec:lan:wpaper:1815 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2007. "Competitive Redistricting," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000748, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Andrei Gomberg & Romans Pancs & Tridib Sharma, 2023. "Electoral Maldistricting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1223-1264, August.
    12. Kyle Gatesman & James Unwin, 2018. "Lattice Studies of Gerrymandering Strategies," Papers 1808.02826, arXiv.org.
    13. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices," Discussion Papers 11-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    14. Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka, 2006. "Public choice principles of redistricting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 381-398, December.
    15. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2022. "Gerrymandering and the Limits of Representative Democracy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2328, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. repec:lan:wpaper:1932 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:lan:wpaper:616564 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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