How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis
AbstractThis paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the 'fair cake division' results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. The author analyzes existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, she finds that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 469.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
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- Berliant, Marcus & Thomson, William & Dunz, Karl, 1992. "On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-216.
- Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm," Working Papers 92-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2007. "Competitive Redistricting," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000748, UCLA Department of Economics.
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American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-41, September.
- Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007.
"Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471, November.
- Coate, Stephen & Knight, Brian, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," Working Papers 07-06, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- repec:lan:wpaper:616564 is not listed on IDEAS
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices," Discussion Papers 11-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why "pack and crack" does not work," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 93-96, October.
- Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bracco, Emanuele, 2013. "Optimal districting with endogenous party platforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-13.
- Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka, 2006. "Public choice principles of redistricting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 381-398, December.
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