Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why "pack and crack" does not work
AbstractWe show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in "unwinnable" districts ("packing") and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins ("cracking").
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 105 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Districting Gerrymandering NP-complete problems;
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