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Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information

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  • Ed Hopkins
  • Tatiana Kornienko

Abstract

This paper analyses comparative statics for two classes of n-player games of incomplete information with continuous action spaces. The two classes are defined by differences in the payoff and behaviour of the weakest type: the lowest value bidder or highest cost firm. We show that in ``weakly competitive games'', including all-pay auctions and some oligopoly models, weak types will respond to a stochastically higher distribution of types by playing less aggressively. In ``strongly competitive'' games, all types play more aggressively. Furthermore, we show that a decrease in dispersion of types, in the sense of a refinement of second order stochastic dominance, although also associated with an increase in competitiveness, may in addition result in less aggressive play by strong types in both strongly and weakly competitive games.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000662.

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Date of creation: 06 Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000662

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  1. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  2. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
  3. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
  4. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 395-409, November.
  5. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 1999. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Virginia Economics Online Papers 337, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  6. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
  7. John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 325-334, March.
  8. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September.
  9. An, Mark Yuying, 1998. "Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 350-369, June.
  10. Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Game Theory and Industrial Organization," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1307, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Susan Athey, 2002. "Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 187-223, February.
  12. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1970. "On the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 244-263, September.
  14. Spulber, Daniel F, 1995. "Bertrand Competition When Rivals' Costs Are Unknown," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-11, March.
  15. Athey, Susan, 2002. "Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty," Scholarly Articles 3372263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
  17. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Information-Based Relative Consumption Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 93-118, 01.
  18. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  19. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
  20. Ramos, Hector M. & Ollero, Jorge & Sordo, Miguel A., 2000. "A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 286-292, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2006. "Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000621, UCLA Department of Economics.

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