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Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Maher Said

Abstract

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000000111.

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Date of creation: 29 Jul 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000111

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  1. Doepke, Matthias & Townsend, Robert M, 2004. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4455, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Yossi Aviv & Amit Pazgal, 2008. "Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 339-359, December.
  3. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 236-248, February.
  6. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Marco Battaglini, 2003. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics 505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004. "Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Dec 2004.
  10. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Simon Board, 2008. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 391-413.
  12. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
  13. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. M Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," Microeconomics Working Papers 22207, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  15. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
  16. Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717, October.
  17. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2009. "Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1576-87, September.
  18. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
  19. S. Christian Albright, 1974. "Optimal Sequential Assignments with Random Arrival Times," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 60-67, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Katehakis, Michael N. & Puranam, Kartikeya S., 2012. "On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 76-84.
  2. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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