Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
AbstractWe survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000000111.
Date of creation: 29 Jul 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2010.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
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