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Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models

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  • J C Fellingham
  • Y K Kwon
  • D P Newman

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Suggested Citation

  • J C Fellingham & Y K Kwon & D P Newman, 2010. "Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1953, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:1953
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs41953.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baiman, S & Demski, Js, 1980. "Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation And Control-Systems," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18, pages 184-220.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Townsend, Robert M., 2011. "Information-constrained optima with retrading: An externality and its market-based solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1042-1077, May.
    2. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1995. "Randomization in optimal income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 189-223, February.
    3. Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Prescott, Edward C., 2002. "Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 39-69, November.

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