Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy
AbstractNew international standards for environmental auditing are now being actively promoted by public authorities and adopted by private firms. One important feature of these standards is their emphasis on managerial systems and incentives that support a wiser use of environmental resources. This paper studies such a system, in which incentive compensation may be based in part on the results of an environmental audit. It is found that optimal wages after an environmental audit is performed should have a greater range than wages paid when no audit has occured. It is also shown that the decision to conduct an environmental audit and the size of the expected wage in this case depend crucially on whether the agent's prudence (or precautionary motives) dominates or not his aversion to risk. It is finally found that the insertion of environmental audits within current management systems would certainly induce a manager to care more about the environment; moreover, although this may come at the expense of less concern for other activities, we find plausible circumstances in which properly designed environmental audits overcome such a tradeoff and increase the manager's attention to both environmental and traditional tasks. The public policy maker's role and interest in promoting environmental auditing standards is also discussed briefly. De nouvelles normes pour les audits environnementaux sont actuellement en train d'Ãªtre Ã©laborÃ©es et implantÃ©es par les gouvernements et les entreprises. Ces normes mettent principalement l'accent sur les systÃ¨mes de gestion et les incitations qui encouragent un meilleur usage des ressources environnementales. Cet article Ã©tudie un tel systÃ¨me, oÃ¹ la rÃ©munÃ©ration pourrait dÃ©pendre en partie des conclusions d'un audit environnemental. On trouve que le salaire versÃ© aprÃ¨s la tenue d'un audit devrait varier davantage que celui versÃ© lorsqu'il n'y a pas eu d'audit. On montre aussi que la dÃ©cision d'effectuer un audit environnemental e
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 33 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
Other versions of this item:
- H. Landis Gabel & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1996. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-21, CIRANO.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- M49 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Other
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jouini, Elyès & Marin, Jean-Michel & Napp, Clotilde, 2010.
"Discounting and divergence of opinion,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 830-859, March.
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2004. "Corporate Strategies For Managing Environmental Risk (The International Library Of Environmental Economics And Policy – Volume xx)," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-43, CIRANO.
- Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
- Facundo Albornoz & Matthew A Cole & Robert J R Elliott & Marco G Ercolani, 2008.
"In Search of Environmental Spillovers,"
08-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Armin Schmutzler, 2001.
"Environmental Regulations and Managerial Myopia,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Paul Calcott, 2010. "Mandated self-regulation: the danger of cosmetic compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 167-179, October.
- Peter Goldsmith & Rishi Basak, 2001. "Incentive Contracts and Environmental Performance Indicators," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(4), pages 259-279, December.
- Goldsmith, Peter D. & Basak, Rishi, 1999. "Environmental Performance Indicators And Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21546, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Cole, Matthew A. & Elliott, Robert J.R. & Shimamoto, Kenichi, 2006.
"Globalization, firm-level characteristics and environmental management: A study of Japan,"
Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 312-323, September.
- Matthew Cole, Robert Elliott and Kenichi Shimamoto, 2005. "Globalization, Firm-Level Characteristics and Environmental Management: A Study of Japan," Discussion Papers 05-17, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Marcel Boyer & M. Martin Boyer & René Garcia, 2005. "The Value of Real and Financial Risk Management," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-38, CIRANO.
- CHANDER, Parkash, 2000. "A simple measure of risk aversion in the large and an application," CORE Discussion Papers 2000041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Parkash Chander, 2004. "Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 531, Econometric Society.
- BOYER, Marcel & BOYER, Martin M. & GARCIA, René, 2010. "The Alleviation of Coordination Problems through Financial Risk Management," Cahiers de recherche 06-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- CHANDER, Parkash, 2005.
"Repetitive risk aversion,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2000. "Environmental Risk Management and the Business Firm," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-23, CIRANO.
- Tom Tietenberg, 1998. "Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 587-602, April.
- Warnken, Jan & Bradley, Melanie & Guilding, Chris, 2004. "Exploring methods and practicalities of conducting sector-wide energy consumption accounting in the tourist accommodation industry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 125-141, January.
- Laurent Franckx & Alessio D'Amato, 2003. "Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0312, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Gollier, Christian, 2002. "Optimal Prevention of Unknown Risks: A Dynamic Approach with Learning," IDEI Working Papers 139, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Boyer, Marcel & Robert, Jacques, 2006. "Organizational inertia and dynamic incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 324-348, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.