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Alliances de villes pour le climat - Modélisation par la théorie des jeux

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  • Angel Prieto

Abstract

Ce texte rapporte les travaux effectués lors du stage de recherche d'Angel Prieto au CIRANO, sous la direction de Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Directeur scientifique et Fellow du CIRANO. Ce travail s’intéresse aux initiatives infranationales pour lutter contre les changements climatiques. Plus précisément, nous partons du constat de l’insuffissance des négociations internationales à adresser seules ce problème, pour étudier la pertinence des alliances de villes. À partir de l’étude de cas de C40, une approche empirique fondée sur des entretiens et des recherches documentaires permet de mettre en évidence les spécificités de ce mode de coordination. Ceci sert ensuite de base à la construction d’un modèle théorique de villes en réseau, que nous exploitons grâce à d’outils de la théorie des jeux. Nous mettons ainsi en évidence l’émergence d’équilibres de coordination pour les villes en réseau, et nous étudions l’influence de divers paramètres sur les caractéristiques des équilibres, avant de nous pencher sur la question des inégalités villes/campagnes et la problématique de redistribution. Grâce à l’étude d’une échelle qui a été jusqu’à ce jour délaissée par les modèles théoriques, ce travail contribue au champ de l’analyse des accords environnementaux par la théorie des jeux, ouvrant la possibilité à de nombreuses extensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Angel Prieto, 2019. "Alliances de villes pour le climat - Modélisation par la théorie des jeux," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-16, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-16
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2019s-16.pdf
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    Keywords

    ; Environnement; Réseaux; Villes; Théorie des jeux;
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