Rich Meets Poor - an International Fairness Experiment
AbstractWhy do people in rich countries not transfer more of their income to people in the world's poorest countries? To study this question and the relative importance of needs, entitlements, and nationality in people's social preferences, we conducted a real effort fairness experiment where people in two of the world's richest countries, Norway and Germany, interacted directly with people in Uganda and Tanzania, two of the world's poorest countries. In this experiment, the participants were given the opportunity to transfer money to poor persons with whom they were matched. The study provides four main findings. First, entitlement considerations are crucial in explaining the distributive behavior of rich people in the experiment; second, needs considerations matter a lot for some participants; third, the participants acted as moral cosmopolitans; and finally, the participants' choices are consistent with a self-serving bias in their social preferences.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway in its series CMI Working Papers with number 10.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Alexander W. Cappelen & Karl Ove Moene & Erik �. S�rensen & Bertil Tungodden, 2008. "Rich meets Poor - An International Fairness Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-098/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012.
"Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
- Riedl Arno & Exelle Ben d, 2010.
"Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters,"
065, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- D'Exelle, Ben & Riedl, Arno, 2010. "Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters," IZA Discussion Papers 5356, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ben D'Exelle & Arno Riedl, 2010. "Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 3287, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ben d'Exelle & Arno Riedl, 2010. "Directed generosity and network formation: Network dimension matters," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-15, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Luis Moreno-Garrido, 2012.
"Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(4), pages 138-149, October.
- Luis José Blas Moreno Garrido & Ismael Rodríguez Lara, 2012. "Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production," Working Papers. Serie AD 2012-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Franzen, Axel & Pointner, Sonja, 2012. "Anonymity in the dictator game revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 74-81.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Sjursen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.