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From Predation to Production Post-conflict

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  • Satish Chand

Abstract

This paper builds an analytical framework that models predation (banditry) and production as part of the choice of a rational utility-maximising agent. Aggregating this choice up for society produces equilibrium outcomes ranging from Utopia (where no one predates) to Amorphy (where everyone does). The intermediate position constitutes Anarchy where a mix of predation and production prevail. This framework shows that (i) organized conflict can lower welfare relative to the level that prevails without such organization; and, (ii) peacekeeping raises welfare, but the equilibrium is self-enforcing only with the requisite level of peacekeeping technology. The last is then used to analyse conditions under which peacekeeping arises endogenously and the potential (and catalytic) role for external assistance in the above.

Suggested Citation

  • Satish Chand, 2010. "From Predation to Production Post-conflict," Working Papers 200, Center for Global Development.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:200
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    File URL: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423695
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    References listed on IDEAS

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