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Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of Taxation

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Author Info
Wolfram Richter ()

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Abstract

Delayed Integration ("DI") is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the receiving country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay home taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Origin Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor while a close substitute to the latter - the Nationality Principle - is underlying U.S. tax law. The paper studies the potential merits of DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the social cost of tax distortion and the social cost of wasteful government.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 802.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_802

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(1), pages 85-107, February.
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Rauscher, 2000. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 89-, September.
  3. Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael Keen & David E. Wildasin, 2001. "Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation," Public Economics 0112003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wolfram Richter, 2001. "Delayed Integration of Mobile Labor: A Principle for Coordinating Taxation, Social Security, and Social Assistance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 73-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2004. "Migration, Social Standards and Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration," NBER Working Papers 10798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2005. "Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-IncomeWorkers in the Industrialized Countries against the Forces of Globalizationand Market Integration," Discussion Papers in Economics 937, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alfons Weichenrieder & Oliver Busch, 2005. "Artificial Time Inconsistency as a Remedy for the Race to the Bottom," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2005. "Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-Income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 375-393, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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