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Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Hazem Alshaikhmubarak
  • R. Richard Geddes
  • Shoshana Amyra Grossbard
  • Shoshana Grossbard

Abstract

Under the common-law system of coverture in the United States, a married woman relinquished control of property and wages to her husband. Many U.S. states passed acts between 1850 and 1920 that expanded a married woman’s right to keep her market earnings and to own separate property. The former were called married women’s earnings acts (MWEAs) and the latter married women’s property acts (MWPAs). Scholarly interest in the acts’ effects is growing. Researchers have examined how the acts affected outcomes such as women's wealth-holding and educational attainment. The acts' impact on women’s non-marital birth decisions remains unexamined, however. We postulate that the acts caused women to anticipate greater benefits from having children within rather than outside of marriage. We thus expect passage of MWPAs and MWEAs to reduce the likelihood that single women become mothers of young children. We use probit regression to analyze individual data from the U.S. Census for the years 1860 to 1920. We find that the property acts in fact reduced the likelihood that single women have young children. We also find that the “de-coverture” acts’ effects were stronger for literate women, U.S.-born women, in states with higher female labor-force participation, and in more rural states, consistent with predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazem Alshaikhmubarak & R. Richard Geddes & Shoshana Amyra Grossbard & Shoshana Grossbard, 2017. "Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6471, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6471
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jason M. Lindo & Krishna Regmi & Isaac Swensen, 2020. "Stable Income, Stable Family," NBER Working Papers 27753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bansak, Cynthia & Grossbard, Shoshana & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2022. "Mothers’ caregiving during COVID: The impact of marital property laws on women’s labor force status," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    3. Shoshana Grossbard, 2023. "Non-Marital Childbearing and Marital Property Laws: An Application of the WIHO Model," Working Papers 2023-005, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    4. Bansak, Cynthia & Grossbard, Shoshana & Wong, Crystal (Ho Po), 2021. "Mothers' Caregiving during COVID: The Impact of Divorce Laws and Homeownership on Women's Labor Force Status," IZA Discussion Papers 14408, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property; earnings; family; law; fertility; marriage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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